In our War of Ideas against both representatives of Islam and their Western politically correct defenders, there are some urgent tools we currently lack in our War of Ideas arsenal.
These tools may be categorized according to one major division—between tools for the Infidel public at large on the one hand, and, on the other hand, tools for more specialized Infidel professionals in the fields of academe, the news media, intelligence, and the military branches. (Of course, the utility and value of all the tools are interchangeable across both categories, but some may be more appropriately pursued in one or the other.)
A. TOOLS FOR THE INFIDEL PUBLIC SECTOR
I. Central Database for Jihadist Attacks
There should exist a central database for all apparently jihad-related incidents throughout the Dar-al-Harb (the non-Muslim world).
a) Geographical Breakdown: This central database should have regional subdivisions, from continent, down to nation, down to state or province, down to city, down to village or rural area—and the data among the various subdivisions should also be interchangeable and universally accessible.
b) Typological Breakdown: This central database should have subdivisions according to type of jihad, ranging from the “Sudden Jihad Syndrome” all the way up to major attacks such as 911, and everything in between. (Needless to say, the collocation of various degrees of in-between type attacks in places like India would be a far more complex and laborious undertaking than it would be for a place like the U.S.A.)
II. Comprehensive Booklet
We also continue to lack a single comprehensive booklet or tutorial that would adumbrate in simple yet sufficiently complete form all the relevant information we Infidels need—in our communications and dialogues with Muslim apologists, their PC defenders, and hopeful agnostics who seem to be progressing along the learning curve about the Problem of Islam—concerning the following:
1) The dangerous and pernicious aspects of Islam, based on foundational doctrine (Qur’an, Hadiths, Sira, Islamic jurisprudence), as well on current sociocultural and ideological media of same, broadly surrounding the following:
2) The apologetic defense arguments (indirectly related to or directly occasioned by #1).
3) Our counter-arguments to #2, as well as further counter-arguments to apologetic responses to our counter-arguments.
This comprehensive booklet must have two qualities: it must be unique and supreme. If it is crafted along the lines of the thousands of other books, articles and websites that exist out there as an ever-increasing mountain of bewildering information about Islam, it will be useless, or redundant at best, or will actually exacerbate the bewildering cornucopia of information out there. It has to be the last word on a comprehensive tutorial about what we Infidels need to know about Islam. This does not mean it will contain all knowledge about Islam, nor all knowledge about the Problem of Islam. It only means that it will contain sufficient information for the purposes Infidels require—no more, and no less.
This would be a simple Top 20 list of key things we need to know about Islam, which would function as a sort of lighter and quicker version—for more casual and/or propaideutic interactions (perhaps a relatively brief conversation with someone at work during coffee break, or perhaps a letter to a newspaper editor, etc.)—of the Booklet described in II above.
B. TOOLS FOR THE INFIDEL PROFESSIONAL CLASSES
Of course, the professional classes in the fields of academe, the news media, intelligence, and the military branches would require the three tools described in A.I.-III. above. In addition, these professional classes must also have the following (some or perhaps all of these are already in place or are being developed):
I. Education in the Strategy and Tactics of the Enemy in light of Islamic texts and history.
This kind of education would go beyond the parameters of A.II. above, focusing on how the Qur’an, the Hadiths and other Islamic texts, as well as military behaviors and military doctrine of Muslims throughout Islamic history, might shed light on current jihadism as well as possible plots and planning for same in the future.
II. Islamic Language Proficiency: Arabic, Farsi, and other major languages of Muslims such as in Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, as well as African countries.
1) Training an elite cadre in fluency in any one or any combination of the above languages.
2) Broadly familiarizing all professionals who have any role to play in the War of Ideas with important and key words and phrases among the top five of the above languages.
3) Seeking out and hiring persons who already have fluency in any one or combination of the above languages—with an overwhelming hiring bias toward non-Muslims and, wheresoever our needs are not matched by the extant pool of non-Muslim applicants, Muslims whose “moderation” has been vetted.
III. Jihadist Group Database
This would attempt to be a comprehensive identification and description of all known and suspected jihadist groups anywhere in the world, ranging from the most rudimentary and amateurish to the most sophisticated.
IV. Jihadist Individuals Database
This would attempt to be a comprehensive identification and description of all known and suspected jihadist individuals anywhere in the world, again ranging along a wide spectrum, from a lone “Sudden Jihad Syndrome” perpetrator all the way up to Osama bin Laden, and everywhere in between.
V. Jihadist/‘Moderate’ Muslim Interface Database
This would attempt to be a comprehensive identification and description of all known Muslims—particularly including those who are ostensibly “moderate” or “secular” or “Westernized”—who have some degree of connection to, or affiliation with, jihadist individuals and/or groups. The degrees may range along a wide spectrum, including as little evidence as is feasible. The connections and/or affiliations may be determined by consideration of any combination of personal, familial, tribal, social, cultural, financial, academic, institutional, religious or ideological factors.