Monday, August 18, 2008
The prevailing unicorn of the PC MC paradigm:
the "moderate Muslim"
The “moderate Muslim” is a symbolism. Some symbolisms adequately reflect reality, others do not.
I. The PC MC reality.
The reality in question with the moderate Muslim symbolism in the minds of the politically correct multi-culturalists (PC MC) is basically three-fold:
1. That the vast majority of Muslims in the world are moderate.
2. That this vast majority of moderate Muslims potentially plays a key role in protecting us from Islamic terrorism.
3. That our treatment of this vast majority will either help or hurt our chances of being protected from Islamic terrorism, depending on whether we respect this vast majority, or whether we demonize it.
As for #1, there is no evidence for this. It is just an axiomatic assumption, apparently based upon the superimposition upon the Muslim world of Western sociocultural models. And for this reason, #2 will have little traction if #1 is not accurate. Meanwhile, #3 is basically incoherent, if not laughable.
II. The AIM reality.
There is another reality, however, that tends to undermine the PC MC version, also three-fold. This is the reality as seen by those in the anti-Islam movement (AIM):
1. The mountain of current data about Islamic violence, Islamic injustice, and the various cultural pathologies throughout Muslim societies around the world, as well as the seemingly nearly universal unwillingness of Muslims to admit their sociocultural faults regarding all of the above.
2. Another mountain of data—from history, also about Islamic violence, Islamic injustice, and the various cultural pathologies throughout Muslim societies around the world. About this mountain too, the vast majority of Muslims seem to be in obstreperous denial.
3. Significant indications from the texts and traditions of Islam, as well as from current expressions from various Muslims (spokespersons, clerics, polls of ordinary Muslims), pointing to the probability that the “moderate Muslim” is in fact a myth, or at best a very small minority, while the vast majority either actively supports or passively enables (or more likely a mixture of both) the broad problems mentioned in II.1-2.
III. Conflicting realities.
Now, there is a problem of the problem: Those of us who tend to subscribe to the reality under the rubric of roman numeral II do not have sufficient evidence to easily persuade someone in doubt about the overall question—and certainly continue to fail to persuade those who have been deformed by PC MC. For the former class of people—those sincerely on the fence—the reality we in the anti-Islam movement (AIM) are trying to communicate is simply too vast, complex and amorphous to be amenable to a simplex level of evidentiary persuasion. For those in the latter class (evidently still the majority throughout the West), this problem is compounded by the complex mechanisms of PC MC reality—or rather with the ways that the PC MC paradigm treats and interprets the data of reality. With the latter class, we are not merely trying to marshall and present evidence, for no amount of evidence is sufficient to overcome the PC MC mechanisms, which have the paradoxical effect of using more evidence of Islamic pathology as fuel for their interpretation that there is nothing wrong with Islam and most Muslims. We also need to assail and undermine their PC MC paradigm; for if we fail to do that, no amount of evidence we bring to their table will suffice to change their minds.
IV. The function of the “moderate Muslim”.
1. For the PC MC majority, the moderate Muslim symbolism serves the following functions:
a. As a point of constant reassurance, to assuage the semi-conscious dread of an Islam Redivivus that must exert itself on their minds.
b. Closely related to (a), it serves to maintain the PC MC paradigm, for the moderate Muslim symbolism, particularly since 911, has become the crux of the entire paradigm.
c. Finally, closely related to both (a) and (b), it serves the function of being the central pivot for the project of our salvation from the looming and metastasizing problem of Islamic terrorism.
Note: Indeed, terrorism and its agents—denominated under various Ismological truncations such as “Islamist” or “Wahabbist” or “Salafist”—serve the same function, as the opposite side of the coin: for just as “true Islam” is represented by this mythical vast majority of moderate Muslims, so too the danger emanating out of Islam is drastically reduced and denatured as a “twisting” or “hijacking” of Islam by a “tiny minority of extremists”. For the PC MC paradigm, there is no significant fungibility or influence flowing from Islam to “Islamism” and, for the most part, other causes are adduced to explain the apparently random and spontaneous generation of dangerous “Islamism” out of a wonderfully diverse Third World “religion of peace” whose vast majority of followers are assumed to be peaceful. One incoherent complication to this mechanism of the PC MC paradigm is the recognition that apparently peaceful Muslims can become “radicalized” at the drop of a fez; however, coherence (at least a pretense of it) is quickly restored by assigning all blame for that radicalization on our Western insensitivity, stupidity and disrespect for the precious wonderfulness of Muslims and their Islamic culture.
2. For the majority in AIM, on the other hand, the moderate Muslim symbolism serves the following functions:
a. Stealth Jihad: by propagating and institutionalizing throughout the West the moderate Muslim symbolism and all that it entails (cf. I.1-3), this gives untold numbers of Muslims within the West nearly carte blanche to pursue their agenda of stealth jihad—i.e., the clever insinuation of thousands of roots and tendrils of crypto-Sharia law. This may not yet actually be the imposition, or installation, of full-blown Sharia law anywhere in the West, but it does seem to involve the slow and gradual phasing in of more and more of it. Not only is crypto-Sharia inimical to Western values in and of itself, but it also incorporates various means of inhibiting Western intelligence and analysis of the connections between Islam and terrorism, by working symbiotically with PC MC psychology and structures to strengthen the concept of a legally punishable “blasphemy” against Islam and Muslims, cloaked as an alleged “bigotry” and “Islamophobia”.
b. Undercover Terrorism: another effect is giving untold numbers of false moderates—virtually indistinguishable from actual moderates—enormous access to deep enclaves within the West in which to set up cells and plan various types of terrorism.
c. Conceptual Confusion: closely related to the two effects described above is that of inculcating and reinforcing in Western societies the unproven axiom that a majority—even a “vast” majority—of Muslims are moderates, when this is precisely one of the major points that needs to be proven before becoming assumed. Following on the heels of this is the problem of defining exactly what “moderation” consists in: is a Muslim “moderate” if he claims to support democracy, socializes with his non-Muslims friends at college or at work, drives an SUV, wears Western clothes, has a wife who does not wear the hijab, but at the same time one finds out that this Muslim supports Sharia as a viable concept of “justice” (even if he refrains from the faux pas that he wants to see the West ruled under it), thinks the Caliphate was a good thing, finds little or not fault in Islamic history, thinks Mohammed was a good and just ruler, thinks various Islamic organizations connected to terrorism are okay; and so forth. Or there is the slightly more “observant” Muslim, whose wife does wear a hijab (perhaps just a mild form of a head-covering, brightly colored and fashionable), and he is even a little more forthright about the “oppression” of his “brothers and sisters” and what needs to be done; but, given the climate of PC MC in the West, even he may fall outside of the definition of a “radical”, if only because he falls short of actually saying “I'm going to kill you”. A further wrinkle to this conceptual incoherence was mentioned above in the Note under IV.1—namely, the idea that even moderates are not safe from “radicalization” insofar as they may be driven to it by too much “insensitivity” and lack of “respect” on our part. This preposterous idea would seem to put the entire concept of “moderation” on shaky ground, for if a previously solidly moderate Muslim can become transformed into a “radical” ready to support sedition, terrorism and military supremacism after merely getting his precious religious feelings hurt, how “moderate” was he in the first place? The PC MC people, needless to say, never seem to ask themselves this question. Upshot: If we cannot define with precision what “moderation” is, and if we cannot ensure that our definition excludes not only overt violence and sedition but also ideological and psychological predispositions for same, then the symbolism becomes worthless. Alas, the current uselessness of the symbolism has not stopped thousands of influential analysts and think tanks in various governments and news media organizations throughout the West, including in the U.S.A., from employing it in a central way as the pivot in their anti-terrorist paradigm.
Perhaps a glimmer of hope lies buried in IV.1.b above. Since the moderate Muslim symbolism has become the crux of the PC MC paradigm, and since symbiotically the symbolism’s influential function depends upon the PC MC paradigm, then if certain things happen in the near future to sufficiently undermine the confidence in the symbolism, this may well exert a destructive effect on all the interconnections that keep the paradigm together. Put simply: if faith in the moderate Muslim is sufficiently shaken, it could trigger a concatenation of effects that could cause the entire PC MC paradigm to come crashing down, perhaps as rapidly—if not quite as peacefully—as the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.