Thursday, February 24, 2011

Revolting Muslims


























Pun intended.


All seriousness aside (as Steve Allen would have said), this essay is meant only to sketch in some basic ground rules for how the West should frame the remarkable domino effect of popular revolts against government going on in the Middle East and Africa.

First, we should take care to avoid certain glib assumptions that ignore the profound singularities of each polity currently undergoing popular uprisings: each nation we hear about in the news is not just a sandlot next door to the next, each one more or less a copy of the next, but a cultural microcosm in its own right with a rich and unique history of its own -- even if a large chunk of that history and culture involves the torturously diseased stranglehold of Islam for centuries after initial bloody conquests by Muslims in the century after Mohammed throughout the region. Thus, Algeria is not more or less the same as Tunisia; nor is Tunisia more or less the same as Egypt; etc. Each is, in certain important respects, a cultural world of its own with a multifaceted history, cultural identity and cultural diversity, of its own.

That said, however -- and here comes the Islamic "but" (which should be, for those of us Unbelievers denied Paradise, as big as the mile-wide female butts promised Believers granted said Paradise) -- there is among these countries a unifying factor: Islam and the consciousness among all these agitating revolters of being Muslims. This is not a perfectly airtight unity (pace those PC MCs who immediately set up the straw man of "Islam is not a monolith"), but that unremarkable fact does not give license to the analyst to deny all Islamic continuities and cohesion that subsist in Islamic societies across geopolitical, cultural and even doctrinal boundaries.

This relatively unifying factor then leads to the third of our guidelines as we observe this disquieting transformation of a crucial swath of modern Islam.

Let's break it down:

a) Most Muslims support Islam, and all Muslims enable Islam.

b) Islam and Sharia law cannot be separated, for Sharia law is the expression of the Do's and Don't's of Mohammed, who is so important to Muslims they want to kill people who they think insult him.

c) Aside from outrageously regressive and anti-liberal laws for Muslims, Sharia law also envisions and mandates the conquest and submission of all non-Muslims and the killing of those who refuse to submit (preceded by the killing of many as a tactic of terror to bring about strategic advantage), however long that may take, and accomodating situations of temporary political and military weaknesses through the allowance of deceptive strategies -- which include lying about (c) by denying such a desideratum exists in Islamic law.

d) Any popular movement among Muslims therefore augurs more Islam, and because of a-c, that is obviously bad for non-Muslims.

e) The "freedom" which all these revolting Muslims may seem to be seeking is not freedom from the anti-liberal totalitarianism of Islam, but a freedom from the tin-pot tyrants who, in their various deals with the Western Devil in this modern era of Western global hegemony, have in one way or another delimited the scope and practice of Sharia law. These revolting Muslims are merely jumping out of the frying pan of the tin-pot dictators, into the fire of Islamic totalitarianism.

There may well be a "diversity" of degrees of the Sharia which these roilingly variegated Muslims from Tunisia to Yemen desire to see realized in the birth of their new nation. To a great extent, this reflects the historical fact that Sharia as represented from country to country has acquired a semblance of a piecemeal appearance through the forced exigencies of Western Colonialism and after that of Post-Colonialist Western hegemony.

As we Islamoliterate Infidels have learned to our grim dismay, however, there is no acceptable degree of Sharia for the non-Muslim, for it would be like an acceptable degree of Nazism or Satanism. The whole kit and kaboodle is rotten and evil. And, contrary to the dissembling sophistry of Islam apologists (both Muslim and non-Muslim), Sharia law is not a supermarket from whose shelves this or that Muslim can choose what to take: it is a systemic whole whose sole variety subsists in its division into "schools" (
madhahib in Arabic), and in the deceptive appearance of complexity in its obsessive-compulsive jungle of internal minutiae.

To put this clearly with one specfic example out of thousands which could be adduced: it matters little to us Infidels if three different Muslim clerics have a quibbling disputation over what constitutes the lawful grounds for offensively attacking Infidels. What matters, and what is not acceptable in the modern world, is that clerics of any major religion should be seriously (let alone fanatically and demagogically) delineating such a concept at all.

4 comments:

Nobody said...

None of these revolts are anti-Islamic, regardless of the regime in power. If it was an Islam-suppressing regime like in Tunisia, it's an easier pretext for Islamic parties to rebel, while if the regime was either Islamic itself or Leftist-Islamic like Libya, the rebels would simply charge that it wasn't the right implementation of Islam. In other words, a variation of taqfir.

Note that all Muslim countries in the world effectively have Shariah, w/ the possible exception of the former Soviet Muslim republics. It's not like one can apostatize even in democratic (here, I'm using the term democratic to indicate 1-man, 1-vote, and not implying pluralism of some kind, which doesn't exist there) countries like Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, which don't officially have Shariah (except maybe places like Aceh). But when elements of Shariah law are in place, such as Muslimahs being unable to marry Infidel men, non-Muslims being postumously declared Muslims and given Muslim burials over family objections, etc, as far as non-Muslims go, it's only a matter of degree as to whether the regimes in these places are democratically elected 'secular' regimes or ones by Jemiah Islamiah or Jamaat e Islami.

To Muslim women, it would make a difference insofaras under the former, they wouldn't necessarily be stoned for adultery (although when they are in vigil-ante cases, a secular state machinery does nothing) whereas under the latter, they would. But rights of Muslimahs is something I'm not bothered about, since they are every bit as inimical towards Infidels as their menfolk.

So all these revolts against despots are essentially taqfir campaigns - whether it's the Muslim Brotherhood against Mubarak, the revolt against Gadaffi, the recent outster of Ben Ali, et al. Note that in the above cases, anti-Semitism was rampant - both Mubarak & Gadaffi being painted as Zionists, while in Libya, their state TV accuses Zionists and Americans of being behind it all

Hesperado said...

"So all these revolts against despots are essentially taqfir campaigns..."

Excellently pithy nutshell.

Unknown said...

a) Most Muslims support Islam, and all Muslims enable Islam.

*** A Muslim believes in Islam.

b) Islam and Sharia law cannot be separated, for Sharia law is the expression of the Do's and Don't's of Mohammed, who is so important to Muslims they want to kill people who they think insult him.

*** Sharia law is interpretable and can be part of a system in spirit or literally depending if the system is run by theologans or not. People, such as the writer here, forgets (perhaps on purpose) that in fact the majority of the 56 Muslim countries do not have a Sharia Court system at all. Of those that do have it, again the majority only have Sharia family courts in tandem with secular courts and subject to a secular appeals court.

c) Aside from outrageously regressive and anti-liberal laws for Muslims, Sharia law also envisions and mandates the conquest and submission of all non-Muslims and the killing of those who refuse to .....

*** actually that is rubbish and not one of the Sharia active nations actually has that law.

d) Any popular movement among Muslims therefore augurs more Islam, and because of a-c, that is obviously bad for non-Muslims.

*** since A-C is wrong, this assumption is moot.

e) The "freedom" which all these revolting Muslims may seem to be seeking is not freedom from the anti-liberal totalitarianism of Islam....

*** As Kissinger correctly put it the goal for spontaneou popular revolutions is for two reasons only. A corrupt brutal leadership and secondly defranchisement of the population (ie no input or participation in WHATEVER system). Islam had nothing to do with any of these revolutions and not all of the countries are up in arms, why is that we should ask the author of this item.

The reality here Hesberado is that gross generalization does not work and there are no islamists under every bed or involved in every place, location or house in the Islamic world. There are enough variations, opinions, styles, influence and just highliting all the ugly examples to somehow imply it is the majority not only does not work but reflects something more on those that push that line.

I have no problems pointing out all the ugliness of radical clerics, terrorists, despots and the weakness of the moderate majority that simply keeps their mouths shut - I will join you. On the other side of the coin, I dispise agenda based or sensationalism seeking hater-for-profiteers.

Anonymous said...

I have no problems pointing out all the ugliness of radical clerics, terrorists, despots and the weakness of the moderate majority that simply keeps their mouths shut - I will join you. On the other side of the coin, I dispise agenda based or sensationalism seeking hater-for-profiteers

Explain how the radical imams and terrorists are not in complete agreement with Islam as it is described in the Qur'an and Hadith. Explain how peaceful, "moderate" Muslims are more closely following the example of Muhammad, as opposed to the terrorists.

The extremists align more with the ideals inherent in Islam. Any justification for peace in Islam is an aberration and is not supported by the Qur'an.