Saturday, January 17, 2015
Taking the temperature of the Counter-Jihad, part 8
Well, so far as I've been penning these installments in this multi-part series, I've been more concerned than usual to try to be brief and avoid indulging in analytical complexity as I am perhaps too often guilty of doing on this blog; after all, each post thus far has been about a page or less if it were printed out. Surely, that's not asking too much of my reader. However, I may well break that unspoken rule with this particular installment, as I begin to delve into aspects of this problem that may be too complex to do justice to with artificially terse and pithy posts.
First off, the short answer to the question I broached in the last two installments -- can I imagine a workable compromise with the Counter-Jihad Softies? -- is Yes.
But there's a Big But (bigger than the mile-wide butts of the houris of Islamic Paradise). The compromise I would agree to would pertain to what is already underway now anyway: a de facto collaboration in the general direction away from the Mainstream toward the paradigm shift the West is by painstakingly glacial increments turning its U.S.S. Titanic toward as it nevertheless continues to barrel merrily toward the iceberg of Islamic Jihad whose masses of tips & icicles it continues to ignore. Were the Counter-Jihad an actual Anti-Islam Movement with cachet and organization, and with a more substantive toehold (let alone foothold) in the Mainstream -- which means it would perforce have to have developed an actual platform -- then the dissonance between the Softies and the Holistics would magnify and likely force some kind of a confrontation.
I.e., it is precisely the state of relative lack of organization (and its corollary clout) which facilitates a sort of false sense of unity now; a sort of "we have to set our differences aside and work together" philosophy. This is all well and good as things stand, but once the rubber is getting closer to meeting the tarmac, we're going to have to start getting serious (i.e., less abstract and more concretely pragmatic). The day of reckoning -- crystallized by the question, "What do we do about the problem?" -- cannot be put off forever. I only fear that if the Softies continue to hold sway (and their sway is held by virtue of the relative passivity of the likely Majority of Comfortably Incoherent, Passive-Aggressively Don't-Rock-the-Boat Counter-Jihadists), they will continue to steer the Movement (and, as time goes along, to steer a West more and more coming around to rousing itself from its ridiculous Rip Van Winkle Nap as, in the interest of its Fukuyamishly airhead beauty sleep and rose-colored dreams thereof, it continues hitting the snooze alarm on its 90s digital alarm clock flashing 9:11) on a course inexorably dependent on letting Muslims dictate the direction of our response.
On one level, this would be fine, since that has been my position all along -- viz., that it is our intelligent attention to the Mohammedan data that should define our policy, not some hypothetical abstract model of what Must Be the Case tangential to, if not blithely irrespective of, the data on the ground. I.e., we need to err on the side of a casuistic approach, while we judiciously veer away from an inductively speculative template (and I unpacked this perspective in an essay here from about two years ago, Is Islam an "existential threat"?).
However, if the Softies continue to hold sway, what is likely to unfold & devolve from there is an incoherent combination of casuism (responding to the data) and paradigm-driven reaction (forcing the data to conform to the abstract model). The likely result of this kind of approach would be to reinforce the West's neurotically immature De Nile -- much like the person who keeps putting off the medical exam that may reveal he has cancer, hoping that by pretending there's no problem, it'll just go away on its own. And what this will likely entail is to ensure that the inevitable -- Deportation of Muslims from the West -- will be costlier, messier, and bloodier than it needs to be.
Given this, would I continue to compromise and work with the Counter-Jihad Softies as the protracted, metastasizing Train Wreck of our near future continues to unravel?
Do I have a choice? (And the answer to that is in your hands, dear reader, not mine...)